Reminder: The Identity Oracle idea is NOT mine, but I have become convinced that it, or something like it, needs to exist in a healthy Identity Eco-System. The concept is something that was originally proposed by Bob Blakley and expanded upon by him and others at Gartner/Burton Group. I am simply trying to gather the information that exists in a variety of places into one cohesive narrative, and adding my own perspective to move the conversation forward on this topic.
One of the aspects of the Identity Oracle is that it is not a technology but a business that proposes to address the relationship between Subjects, Relying Parties and Authoritative Sources of Information via mechanisms such as Contract Law. I am not a lawyer and I do not play one on TV. So when I had questions about the viability of the Identity Oracle from a Law and Business perspective, I pinged Scott David at K&L Gates. Scott and I have ended up at a lot of the same identity focused events in recent months and I have really enjoyed conversing with him about the intersection of Identity, Privacy and Law. As someone who is passionate about those topics, and works in the domain, he brings a critical insight to this discussion.
My request to Scott was to read my previous blog entry on Identity Oracles and answer if the concept was “… feasible or is it a Utopian vision that is a bridge too far?” The short version of the answer that I got was:
“I agree with much of the strategy of what you suggest in the blog, but I have some comments on tactics”
But because the long version of his answer is so very thought provoking, I am posting it here, with his permission. I do take some liberties below by commenting on Scott’s words and providing external links to some of his references.
Here is Scott, in his own words:
Anil – The following are my personal comments to your blog entry. They do not reflect the views of my firm (K&L Gates LLP) or any of its clients.
I guess I would say you are "getting warmer," but there are some underlying assumptions on the legal side in the path that you outline that will likely prevent achieving internet scale through the path described.
With some changes in assumptions and design and deployment tactics, however, the market-oriented system that you contemplate can, I think, be built to accommodate the needs of global data/identity systems.
If we treat law as a technology (just as "language" is a "technology") in need of standardization, and look at law from a systems, information science, thermodynamics, AND economic incentives perspective, the following additional points quickly suggest themselves as requiring accommodation in internet scale systems.
1) You are right-on with emphasis on contract law. Massively interoperable systems require Rules standardization (not just technical standardization) on a broad scale. The most system relevant rules (the only one's on which system users can rely) will be those that are enforceable. Those are called legal duties. They arise two ways: by legislation (regulation or other government action) or contract. There is no single international legal jurisdiction (see Peace of Westphalia - 1648), so legislation and regulation alone cannot drive standardization. The international law is the law of contracts (minimum coverage of treaties aside).
Standardized, enforceable, international contracts involving remote parties dealing in valuable intangibles/data are entered into literally every second . . .that activity takes place in the current financial markets. Existing financial and other market structures offer a great deal of insight into the likely functioning of future data/information/identity services markets. Lots to discuss here.
There is another reason to rely on contract law. Due to the limited reach of US and other sovereign nation legal jurisdiction in this context, neither the US, nor any other country, can "force" adoption of internet scale data/identity rules.
There is a solid advantage for the US (and other jurisdictions that have reliable legal/political systems), however, and it is the same one that permits U.S. financial markets to maintain ascendancy in the world markets (despite recent deflections). It is the strong "system support value" derived from the US tradition of deference to the "rule of law." To the extent that the US and other similar jurisdictions are able to "attach" their ideas (manifested in their local data/identity-system-supporting laws) of how to structure data/identity systems to the broad and deep "trust" that is placed in their respective legal/political systems worldwide, it will enhance the appeal of the those systems, and the efficacy and authority of persons and institutions that are responsible for such systems.
It is for this reason, incidentally, that OIX processes were organized based on a variety of US and international trusted, developed "market" models (in a variety of self-regulatory settings), and why they focus on reliable, predictable, transparent processes, etc. Systems that offer the best solutions will enjoy the broadest adoption. Reliability and predictability are currently at a premium due to system fragmentation and so are highly desirable at present. In fact, the data/identity system harm "trifecta," i.e., "privacy," "security," and "liability," can all be seen as merely symptoms of lack of reliability and predictability, due to a lack of standardized legal structure at the core of nascent data/identity markets. Core enforceable legal structure yields reliability, predictability and a form of "trust."
I had never given much thought to this but once Scott articulated this point, the focus on Contract Law which can be international in scope vs Legislation which is local makes sense. There are also familiar elements here regarding the concept of “Comparability” vs. “Compliance” (where the former model is preferred) that Dr. Peter Alterman from NIH has often spoken of in regards to Identity Trust Frameworks.
2) You are correct that it is not a technology issue. I introduced the alliterative concept of "Tools and Rules" early on as a rhetorical device to put laws on par with technology in the discussion (which still takes place mainly among technologists). As a former large software company attorney once said "in the world of software, the contract is the product." He did not intend to diminish the efforts of software programmers, just to call out that providing a customer with a copy of a software product without a license that limits duplication would undermine the business plan (since without the contract, that person could make 1 million copies). Similarly, in the future markets for data/identity services, the contract is the product. This is key (see below).
As a technologist it is sometimes hard for me to admit that the truly challenging problems in the Identity and Trust domain are not technical in nature but in the domain of Policy. To paraphrase the remarks of someone I work with from a recent discussion “We need to get policy right so that we can work the technical issues”.
3) Your discussion is based on a property paradigm. There is much to discuss here. The property paradigm does not scale without first establishing some ground rules.
First, the concept of private property was adopted by the Constitution's framers who were familiar with the work of Gladstone (who believed that without property laws, every man must act as a "thief"). Those laws work very well where the asset is "rivalrous," i.e., it can only be possessed/ controlled by one person. This works for all physical assets. For intangible assets, rivalrousness requires a legal regime (e.g., copyright, patent, etc. to create the ability to exclude, since there is no asset physicality to "possess" as against all other claimants to the same asset). The analysis is then, what legal regime will work to support the interactions and transactions in the particular intangible assets involved here (be it identified as "data," "information," "identity" etc.). Data is non-rivalrous (see discussion in 5 below).
I believe that this is a "resource management" type situation (like managing riparian, aquifer, fisheries, grazing or other similar rights) that lends itself to that type of legal regime, rather than a traditional "property" regime. In this alternative, the "property" interest held by a party is an "intangible contract right," rather than a direct interest in physical property. That contract right entitles the party to be the beneficiary of one or more duties of other people to perform actions relating to data in a way that benefits the rights holder. For instance, a "relying party" receives greater benefit (and an IDP is more burdened) at LOA 3 than LOA 2). The "value" of the contract right is measured by the value to the party benefited by the duty.
The resource management structure emphasizes mutual performance promises among stakeholders, rather than underlying property interests. Briefly, consider a river with three types of user groups (40 agricultural (irrigation) users upstream, 2 power plants midstream (cooling), and a city of 100,000 residential water users downstream (consumption and washing, etc.)). Each rely on different qualities of the water (irrigation is for supporting plant metabolism (stomata turgidity, hydrogen source for manufacturing complex carbohydrates in photosynthesis, etc.), power plants use water for its thermal capacity, and residents use it for supporting human metabolism (consumption) and as a fairly "universal solvent" (for washing, etc.). When there is plenty of water in the river, there is no conflict and each user can use it freely without restriction. When there is too little water, or conflicting usage patterns, there can be conflicting interests. In that situation, it is not property interests, per se, that are applied to resolve the conflicts, but rather mutually agreed upon duties documented in standard agreements that bind all parties to act in ways consistent with the interests of other parties.
Like water, data is a resource that has many different user groups (among them data subjects, relying parties and identity providers), with needs sometimes in conflict. Notably, because data is not a physical resource, the "scarcity" is not due to physical limitation of the resource, but rather is due to the exertion of the rights of other parties to restrict usage (which is indistinguishable legally from a physical restriction).
The property paradigm can be employed for certain forms of intellectual property, such as copyrights, but those systems were not designed to accommodate large "many to many" data transfers. Arrangements such as BMI/ASCAP (which organize music licensing for public radio play, etc.) are needed to help those systems achieve scale.
In any event, there is also a question of ownership where "data" is generated by an interaction (which is most (or all?) of the time). Who "owns" data about my interactions with my friends, me or them? If both parties "own" it, then it is more of a rights regime than a "property" regime as that term is generally understood. Who owns data about my purchase transactions at the supermarket, me or the store? It takes two to tango. We will be able to attribute ownership of data about interactions and relationships to one or the other party (in a non-arbitrary fashion) only when we can also answer the question "who owns a marriage?", i.e., never. You quote Bob Blakley who speaks about "your" information. I take that to be a casual reference to the class of information about someone, rather than an assertion of a right of exclusive possession or control. If it is the latter, it seems inconsistent with the indications that the database will be an "asset" of the Identity Oracle. That separation could be accomplished through a rights regime.
There is also the linguistics based problem of "non-count nouns." Certain nouns do not have objects associated with them directly. Gold and water are good examples. I don't say "I have a gold." or I have a water." In order to describe an object, it needs a "container/object convention" ("a gold necklace" or "a glass of water.") Data is a non-count noun. When it is put in a "container" (i.e., when it is observed in a context), it becomes "information." It makes no sense for me to point to a snowbank and say "there is my snowball in that snowbank." Instead, I can pick up a handful of snow (separate it out from the snowbank) and then make that declaration. Similarly, in the era of behavioral advertising, massive data collection and processing, it makes little sense to say, "there is my personal information in that data bank" (unless the data is already correlated in a file in a cohesive way, or is an "inventory control" type number such as an SSN). It takes the act of observation to place data in the information "container."
As a result, it will take more to allow parties to exert any type of "property" interests in data (even those property interests under a contract "rights regime."). First, you need to make a data "snowball" (i.e., observe it into the status of "information") from the mass of data.
The paradigm of resource allocation allows DATA to flow, while permitting rules to measure (and restrict or charge for, etc.) information. When we talk, I will share with you the concept of when limitations, measurement, valuation, monetization might be applied. Briefly, when the data is "observed" by a party, I call it a "recognition" event. That observation will always be in a context (of the observer) and be for that observer's subjective purposes. At the point of observation, data is "elevated" to information (the "Heisenberg synapses" in your brain may be firing at this notion). It is at that point that it is the "difference that makes a difference" (to quote Bateson). The first reference to "difference" is the fact that data is carried by a "state change" in a medium. The second reference to "difference" in the Bateson quote is the fact that the data matters to the observer (it has value either monetarily or otherwise). Anyway, this data/information distinction I think lends itself to a system that can allow data to "flow" but can offer appropriate "measurement" at the point of "use" ,i.,e, observation, that can form the basis of legal structures to value, monetize, limit, restrict, protect, etc. the information that the data contains.
This works well with context-based limitation. Ask me about the example using data held by my banker under Gramm Leach Bliley.
The resource allocation and “non-count nouns” concepts are very interesting to me and is something I need to digest, think about and explore a lot more.
4) Bilateral agreements, individually negotiated agreements won't scale. Standard form agreements are used in every market (financial, stock, commodities, electrical grid) where remote parties desire to render the behavior of other participants more reliable and predictable. Even the standardized legal rules of the Uniform Commercial Code (passed in all 50 states) offers standard provisions as a baseline "virtual interoperable utility" for various sub-elements of larger commercial markets (the UCC provides standard terms associated with sales of goods, commercial paper, negotiable instruments, etc. that have established standard legal duties in the commercial sector since the 1940s. . .and establish broad legal duty interoperability that makes information in the commercial sector "flow").
Standard form agreements permit remote parties without direct contractual privity to be assured about each other's performance of legal duties. This reduces "risk" in the environment of the organism (either individual or entity), since it makes the behavior of other parties more reliable and predictable. This saves costs (since parties don't have to anticipate as many external variables in planning), and so has value to parties. The concept of contract "consideration" is the measure of the value to a party for receiving promises of particular future behavior (legal duties) from another party.
The creation of a "risk-reduction territory" through the assignment of standardized legal duties to broad groups of participants is called a "market" in the commercial sector, it is called a "community" in the social sector, and it is called a "governance structure" in the political sector. Those duties can be established by contract or by legislation/regulation. In the present case (as noted above) contract is the likely route to the establishment of duties. Since all three sectors are using a shared resource, i.e., data, improvement of the reliability, predictability and interoperability in any one of the three sectors will yield benefits for participants in all three sectors. An example of this relationship among user groups is evidenced by the willingness of the government authorities to rely on the commercial sector for development of data/identity Tools and Rules.
Standard form agreements enable the creation of either mediated markets (such as those mediated by banks (match capital accumulation to those with borrowing needs), or brokers (match buy and sell orders), etc.), or unmediated markets (such as the use of standard form mortgages or car loan documents to enable the securitization (reselling) of receivables in those markets).
5) Centralized operation and enforcement won't scale. Steven Wright, the comedian, says that he has "the largest seashell collection in the world, he keeps it on beaches around the earth." This is amusing because it stretches the "ownership" concept beyond our normal understanding. Data is seashells. It will be impossible (or at least commercially unreasonable) to try to vacuum all (or even a large portion of) data into a single entity (whether commercial or governmental).
In fact, on page 90 of Luciano Floridi's book "Information - A very short introduction." (Oxford Press) (strongly recommended), the author notes that information has three main properties that differentiate it from other ordinary goods. Information is "non-rivalrous" (we can both own the same information, but not the same loaf of bread), "non-excludable" (because information is easily disclosed and sharable, it takes energy to protect it - how much energy?. . .see wikileaks issues), and "zero marginal cost" (cost of reproduction is negligible). Of these, the non-excludability characteristic suggests that a distributed "neighborhood watch" type system (more akin to the decentralization we observe in the innate and learned immune systems of animals), offers a path to enforcement that is probably more sound economically, politically, mathematically and thermodynamically than to attempt to centralize operation, control and enforcement. That is not to say that the "control reflex" won't be evidenced by existing commercial and governmental institutions. . .it will; it is simply to suggest that each such entity would be well advised to have "Plan B" at the ready.
This does not mean that data (even as "seashells") cannot be accessed centrally; it can due to the gross interoperability of scaled systems based on standardization of tools and rules. The key is "access rights" that will be based on enforceable, consensus-based agreement (and complementary technology standards). This analysis will naturally expand to topics such as ECPA reform, future 4th amendment jurisprudence and a host of related areas, where group and individual needs are also balanced (but in the political, rather than the commercial user group setting). The analysis of those civil rights/security-related issues will benefit from using a similar analysis to that relied upon for configuration of commercial systems, since both will involve the management of a single "data river" resource, and since the requirements imposed on private persons to cooperate with and assist valid governmental investigations will be applied with respect to the use of such commercial systems.
In this context it is critical to separate out the system harms caused by bad actors (that cause intentional harm), and negligent actors (that cause harm without intention). Intentional actors will not be directly discouraged by the formality of structured access rights, which they will likely violate with impunity just as they do now. The presence of structured, common rules provides an indirect defense against intentional actors, however, since it gives the system "1000 eyes." In other words, since much intentional unauthorized access is caused by fooling people through "social engineering " (in online context) and "pretexting" (in telco context), those paths to unauthorized access will be curtailed by a more standardized system that is more familiar to users (who are less likely to be fooled). Security can be built right into the rights, incentives and penalties regime (remind me to tell you about the way they handled the "orange rockfish" problem in one of the pacific fisheries). Again, there is much to discuss here as well.
Also, your business emphasis seems exactly right. Due to the energy requirements to maintain security and system integrity (resist entropy?), the system can only scale if there are incentives and penalties built into the system. Those incentives and penalties need to be administered in a way so that they are distributed throughout the system. The standardized contract model anticipates that. Ultimately, the adoption ("Opt in") curve will be derived from whether or not participation is sufficiently economically compelling for business (in their roles as IDPs, RPs and data subjects), and offers similarly compelling benefits to individuals (in similar roles). This returns the analysis to the "resource management" model.
6) As noted above, there are different user groups that use the same data resources. These include those groups in the gross categories of commercial, social and governmental users. Thus, for example, when I post to a social network a personal comment, that social network may "observe" that posting for commercial purposes. That can be conceived of as a "user group conflict" (depending on the parties’ respective expectations and “rights”) to be resolved by resort to common terms. The good news is that because all user groups are working with a common resource (data), improvement of the structuring for any one user group will have benefits for the other users of the resource as well.
In short, I agree with much of the strategy of what you suggest in the blog, but I have some comments on tactics.
There is a lot of information and concepts here and while a lot of it is something that I can map to my domain (Lack of scalability of bi-lateral agreements and central enforcement and more), there are others that I have not had to deal with before so am slowly working my way thru them. But in either case, I wanted to expose this to the larger community so that it can become part of the conversation that needs to happen on this topic. I for one, am really looking forward to further conversations with Scott on this topic!